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Zimmerman: Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?

1998 Symposium
Privacy and Publicity in a Modern Age:
A Cross-Media Analysis of the First Amendment

WHO PUT THE RIGHT IN THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY?
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman1

I do not love you, Dr. Fell,
But why I cannot tell;
But this I know full well,
I do not love you, Dr. Fell.'
I. INTRODUCTION

"Newbom" common law causes of action, like children, are
infinitely lovable and promising at birth, but as their characters
develop with age, their appeal may lessen and their apparent
potential may never be achieved.' At first blush, the right of
1. Professor of Law, New York University; B.A., Beaver College, 1963;
J.D., Columbia University, 1976. I greatly appreciate the comments on earlier
drafts by my patient colleagues, in particular those of Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Yochai Benkler, Burt Neubome, and Roberta R. Kwall. I would also
like to thank my research assistant, Samuel Patmore, for his help in preparing
this article, and to acknowledge the Filomen D'Agostino Greenberg and Max E.
Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at New York University School of Law for its
generous support.
2. THOMAS BROWN, WORKS (vol. iv 1719) (trans. of Martial, Epigrams,
i.32), reprinted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 85 (rev'd 2d ed.
1959).
3. One need only to consider the difficulties that have beset the
development of such "new" torts as intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress or invasion of privacy by publication of accurate personal
information to see that many torts that, a priori, seem like a good idea turn out in
practice to be problematic and of limited utility. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (discussing constitutional problems with tort of
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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publicity seems not to have followed that sad and common path;
barely half a century old, it is widely credited with exceeding even
optimistic expectations for its future. The publicity right, for those
who are unfamiliar with this area of tort law, creates a property
interest in elements of personal identity, allowing individuals or their
successors and assignees to exert legal control over when, whether
and how their various personal characteristics (at a minimum, their
names and actual likenesses) can be used by others for commercial
ends. Some measure of disagreement exists among its advocates
about the appropriate profile of the right -- for example, how long it
should last,5 or the range of attributes and associations that should be
protected by it6 -- and doubts are sporadically voiced about whether
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814
(Cal. 1989) (opting for limitations on who can recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 596 (1982) (discussing
constitutional limitations on recovery for invasion of privacy).

4. The right of publicity has been described by numerous authors and its
history outlined. This effort will not be repeated here. An excellent account
appears in Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 147-78 (1993) [hereinafter
Madow, Popular Culture]. See also, Sheldon W. Halpem, The Right of
Publicity: CommercialExploitation of the Associative Value of Personality,39
VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1203-15 (1986) [hereinafter Halpem, Commercial
Exploitation].
5. Some jurisdictions protect publicity rights for as long as a century after
the death of the individual. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-8 (Michie 1995);
OKLA. STAT. §§ 1448-49 (1991). Professor Roberta Kwall has argued that
justifications for survival of the right begin to fade with time, and should receive
less and less deference after 20 years. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of
Publicity vs. the FirstAmendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70
IND. L.J. 47, 83-85 (1994) [hereinafter Kwall, Property and Liability]. Posner
and Landes, by contrast, have given justifications for allowing the heirs of
George Washington to continue to control the deceased President's publicity
values after two centuries. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 362-63 (1989)
[hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis].
6. Among the kinds of attributes that have received protection have been
catch
phrases, Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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or not federal copyright preemption doctrine acts as a significant
limit on the ability of states to offer this kind of protection.' These
concerns, however, are marginal blips that seem not to disturb the
otherwise serene sense among a significant cross-section of the legal
community -- judges, legislators, and academics alike -- that
publicity rights are a valuable addition to the law and an accepted
part of our legal landscape.
The development of a publicity right has occurred over a few
decades. As recently as 1950, "personality" (that is, some cluster of
identifying personal characteristics) was protected, if at all, solely as
1983) (appropriation of phrase associated with comedian Johnny Carson) and
association with a game show, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971
F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993) (robot in strapless
dress and blond wig flipping letters on game board conjures up association with
game show hostess Vanna White).
White in particular has generated
controversy. The ruling in Ms. White's favor is approved of by some scholars,
see, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture -The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 136-38 (1995) [hereinafter McCarthy, The
Human Persona], and disapproved of by others, see, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpem,
The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the
Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 864-69 (1995)
[hereinafter Halpem, Independent Right]. Judge Alarcon's trenchant critique of
White's far-reaching definition of what constitutes identity is particularly notable
in this regard. He points out that the thing most closely imitated is the set of the
show, Wheel of Fortune, and the set -- without which he doubts that the robot
would have conjured up Ms. White -- is not one of her identifying personal
attributes. 971 F.2d at 1404-05.
7. The Copyright Act specifically provides for preemption of "all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). In addition, state law may be
preempted as a function of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (Florida
law preventing use of molds to duplicate unpatented boat designs undercuts
policies of patent law and is preempted). The best-known case to find a
publicity claim preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act is Baltimore Orioles,
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied,480 U.S. 941 (1987). See also Ahn v. Midway Manufacturing Co., 965
F. Supp. 1134, 1137-38 & n. 2 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal.
Rptr.2d 645, 650-53 (Ct. App. 1996).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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a personal interest subsumed under the law of privacy. The plaintiff,
to state a case, had to show that her name or likeness had been
appropriated without her consent and used for commercial purposes
by the defendant. But the presumed gravamen of the harm was not a
deprivation of property; rather, it was the desire of the plaintiff not to
receive this form of public exposure. Only the affected individual
could sue, and the duration of the cause of action was coextensive
with the duration of the claimant's life.8
Today, however, personality has become a recognized
commodity -- something to be exploited (or not) according to the
preference of the subject or of those who inherit or buy her rights.
As the previous sentence suggests, these personal attributes
frequently continue as marketable goods long after their source is
dead and buried.' Personality as a valid form of property has been
recognized by the American Law Institute in its RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION' ° and, recently, it has even been
touted as a possible candidate for federal statutory protection."
8.
Halpern, Commercial Exploitation, supra note 4, at 1215-23
(discussing the difference between privacy law and property law with regard to
the alienability and descendability of rights to control commercial uses of
personal attributes).
9.
10.

See infra note 34.
The right of publicity is covered by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§

46-49 (1995).

11. Several commentators have supported this idea because, although
they approve of the right of publicity, they consider the proliferation of
inconsistent state laws to be problematic. See, e.g., McCarthy, The Human
Persona, supra note 6, at 141-42; Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of
Publicity Run Riot: The Casefor a FederalStatute, 60 SO. CAL. L. REv. 1179
(1978); Felix H. Kent, An Overview of the Right of Publicity, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
30, 1996, at 3. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a
federal law, see Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the
New Legislative Proposals to Congress--A Panel Discussion, 16 CARDOzO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 102 (1998). A Joint Task Force made up of members of
various committees of the Intellectual Property Section of the American Bar
Association has advocated such a law and has drafted a model statute. A
resolution endorsing a federal approach was adopted by the Section as a whole.
American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law, 1994-95
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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That is not to say that these developments have generated no
protesters (I admit at the outset to being one of them). Critics and
skeptics, however, are frequently written off by those who believe in
publicity rights as a fringe group of cranks and ideologues whose
objections are difficult to take seriously. One supporter of the tort,
for example, expressed his annoyance at current scholarship critical
of publicity rights in the following terms:
It has recently been suggested that "the
fundamental case for a right of publicity seems to be
undergoing a critical reappraisal in the United
States." It would perhaps be more accurate to say
that a very few voices have been raised questioning
the legitimacy of the right....
...[T]he difficulty with this attempt to reopen
that which has been rather clearly settled is that the
current academic attempt to destroy the right rests at
best on marginal issues not seriously implicated by
the right of publicity as it has been developed and at
worst on an ad hoc and self-referential
"deconstruction" of judicial thinking. Indeed, much
of the criticism has its roots in a more general Critical
Legal Studies attack on intellectual property. . ., as
well as in an earlier work that viewed "the growth of
intellectual property [as] uncontrolled to the point of
recklessness".... 1
Another engaged in verbal headscratching over what would
prompt a prominent federal judge, Alex Kozinski, to write a scathing
and highly publicized dissent attacking the tort in a recent case.
Ultimately, this commentator decided that he had to write off the
Judge's ire as a reflection of his personal and idiosyncratic view of
Annual Report at 212-15; 1995-96 Annual Report (Committee No. 205),
Subject 6, 8: Right of Publicity. (On file with author.)
12. Halpern, Independent Right, supra note 6, at 869-70.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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the first amendment. 3 Judge Kozinski, the commentator noted, does
not believe that commercial speech should be subject to less
favorable treatment under the constitution than political
commentary. 4 "This view is not the law," the writer concluded,
"and I personally doubt that it will ever be the law.""
Frankly, it seems to me to be a little premature to describe the
character of the right of publicity as "established" or to conclude that
its critics are ideologues -- either lacking in sufficient discernment to
be able to distinguish marginal from crucial issues, or enthralled by
wrongheaded visions of the first amendment.
For one thing, a glance through a recent, comprehensive survey
of the law in this area indicates that claims that the shape and
substance of publicity rights are "clearly settled" cannot be
substantiated. 6 Many states have rarely or never entertained cases
of any kind involving commercial appropriations of identity, and
have, therefore, had little opportunity to think through the kind and
extent of protection they want to offer plaintiffs in this area."
13. McCarthy, The Human Persona, supra note 6, at 137-38
(commenting on Judge Kozinski's dissent in Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
v. White, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993)).
14. Professor McCarthy was disturbed by the fact that Judge Kozinski, in
his defense of the humorous use of Vanna White's persona in an advertisement,
did not distinguish between parody in theater and other entertainment formats
and parody in a sales pitch. McCarthy, The Human Persona,supra note 6, at
137-38.
15. Id.
16.

1998-99:
(1998) [hereinafter LDRC, 50-STATE

LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50-STATE SURVEY

MEDIA PRIVACY AND RELATED LAW

SURVEY].
17. Alaska, for example, has had no case since 1926. D. John McKay,
Survey of Alaska Privacy and Related Claims Against the Media, in id. 188,
203.
Minnesota has never recognized a cause of action for either
misappropriation or a right of publicity. John P. Borger, et al., Survey of
Minnesota Privacy and Related Claims Against the Media, in id. 794, 800-01.
No case raising the issue has ever arisen in New Hampshire. Richard C.
Gagliuso, Survey of New Hampshire Privacy and Related Claims Against the
Media, in id. 934, 937.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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Furthermore, although it has been estimated that as many as half the
states in the United States recognize a right of publicity, 8 a careful
head count reveals that only about a dozen have taken unambiguous
steps to create a true property right 9 while most of the others
18. Kwall, Propertyand Liability, supra note 5, at 52.
19. This is a generous count because it gives the benefit of the doubt to
publicity in some unclear cases. It is based on the reports contained in LDRC,
50-STATE SURVEY, supra note 16. The process of counting is complicated
by the fact that many state cases talk about the right of publicity but do not
necessarily have law protecting such an interest; they may only recognize
appropriation, or recognize appropriation but misname it a right of publicity.
Although the two torts have many resemblances, the privacy action for
appropriation is the more limited. Typically, the privacy law protects names
and likeness only, see, e.g., Massachusetts, M.G.L. c. 214, § 3A; New York,
N.Y. Civ. RTs. L. §§ 50-51 (West 1998). Publicity may extend to such diverse
things as voice, gestures or mannerisms. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-13-1-7
(1998). Privacy rights are personal in nature; unlike the right of publicity, a
privacy right, it has been argued, cannot be sold or given to someone else and
traditionally lasts only during the lifetime of the protected individual. See
Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 838 (1965) (privacy right in not having one's identity commercially
appropriated not descendible); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F.
Supp. 279, 283-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same). Not only are publicity rights
alienable property interests, but they are capable of enduring beyond the life of
the individual who created the interest. Although the matter, therefore, is
somewhat problematic, the following states are the ones that recognize an
interest more akin to a property than a privacy right: California, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas.
Virginia has a hybrid law that permits protection for up to 20 years after the
death of the subject, but the rights belong to the next of kin, suggesting that the
interest is not alienable. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1998). Case law in some
states is ambiguous, sometimes referring to publicity and misappropriation as if
property and privacy were interchangeable. Nevertheless, these states have not,
thus far, decided a case in which they found the right to be alienable or
descendible. For example, Maryland case law talks about misappropriation as
protecting a property interest, but in other senses treats the cases as ones
sounding in privacy. Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448, 451 (Md.
1984). In six jurisdictions, federal courts have concluded that the right of
publicity is recognized, although the state courts have not affirmed that
conclusion. These states are: Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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continue to offer protections for personality that are either
indistinguishable from, or actually still are governed by, the rules of
the older privacy tort of commercial appropriation."0
Although winning a place in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES will undoubtedly push the tort toward
more uniform definition and broader adoption (state courts and
legislators alike having a tendency to treat restatements as if they
were a kind of ur-law), it can nevertheless be argued that reports of
publicity as established law, like reports of Mark Twain's death, have
been greatly exaggerated.
What is also exaggerated, I would argue, is the characterization
of the questions that persist about the value and validity of the
publicity right as the rearguard indulgence of a few cranky
academics and an eccentric judge or two. This branch of tort law,
celebrated though it may be by many, continues to bear comparison
for a respectable minority to the character of the questionable Dr.
Fell -- the one who was, as you may remember, simply unlikable.
But whereas the poet could not tell us what was so disturbing about
Dr. Fell, critics of the right of publicity have identified many reasons
that the publicity tort leaves a bad aftertaste. Considerations of time,
space and the patience of my readers do not permit a thorough
reexamination of those reasons here.21 Rather, I would like to focus
20. A description of the privacy tort of appropriation can be found in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652C (1977) and its accompanying

commentary. Many of the arguments in this Article against the right of
publicity also apply to the appropriation tort; publicity, however, by virtue of its
tendency to survive the person who gave rise to the interest, is more
mischievous.
21. Among the notable writings in recent years to take significant issue
with aspects of the right of publicity are: Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the
Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders,
10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 365 (1992) [hereinafter Coombe, Author/izing
the Celebrity]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit
Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructingthe Lanham Act and
Rights of Publicity,20 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS (1996) [hereinafter Dreyfuss,
We Are Symbols]; Madow, Popular Culture,supra note 4. Particular credit goes
to Professor David Lange, however, who had the prescience twenty years ago to
understand that the developing right of publicity represented a serious threat to 8
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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on one particular issue that has not, in my view, received adequate
consideration by those on either side of the debate.
Much of the law of publicity seems to hinge on the bet,
expressed by the second of the two passages quoted earlier in this
piece,22 that Judge Kozinski's view of the commercial speech
doctrine is not and never will be the law. If that bet were to be lost,
and I would argue that, to a substantial extent, it has been, then the
foundations of a right of publicity would have to be rethought. If
commercial speech were to receive the same level of protection as a
novel or a film, or even something close to it, the judiciary would be
required to subject publicity rights to a level of rigorous scrutiny
that, up until now, they have largely escaped. The result, I suspect,
could reduce much, although certainly not all, of the current law to
the status of roadkill on the path of legal history. To defend this
proposition, however, a bit of preliminary discussion may be useful.
II. THE ORIGINS OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND How THEY GREw

The tort law protecting the right of publicity is traceable to an
opinion by Judge Jerome Frank, in Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.23 The case involved a dispute between
rival producers of baseball cards, both of which had contracts with a
player that allowed them to use his photograph. The plaintiff
company sued its rival for tortiously inducing the player to breach
his contract granting the plaintiff exclusive rights. The defendant
argued that a contract could not convey exclusive rights because no
one owned the exclusive right to control the use of his own
the public domain. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 J. LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981) [hereinafter Lange, PublicDomain].
22. See notes 13-15, supra, and accompanying text.
23. 202 F. 2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Judge
Frank's opinion is generally agreed to be the first decision to clearly
acknowledge a property right in what Sheldon Halpem calls the "associative
value" of a person's identity. Previously, commercial misappropriation of
identity was protected, if at all, by the common law of privacy. See Madow,
PopularCulture, supranote 4, at 167-74.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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photographic image; instead, the company contended, the contracts
were simply releases from liability, given to both the plaintiff and
the defendant, for any claim of invasion of privacy through
commercial appropriation. Judge Frank disagreed, using the case as
an opportunity to transform the appropriation tort into a form he
deemed more suitable to the needs of famous people. Frank
conceived the publicity right as a way to avoid the awkward and
illogical jump that was necessary whenever entertainers and other
public figures complained of an invasion of privacy when their
celebrity was misappropriated. As Frank pointed out, such persons
did not seek the anonymity desired by the ordinary privacy claimant;
in fact, he wrote, "[Flar from having their feelings bruised through
public exposure of their likenesses, [they] would feel sorely deprived
if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances... ,,24 Thus, it seemed inappropriate
to him that the only claim available to such plaintiffs was that they
were emotionally injured by their exposure to the public eye. By
abandoning privacy and stating openly that the interest in question
was a form of intellectual property, Judge Frank opened the way for
publicity-seeking people to gain control over what Professor
Sheldon Halpern has called the "associative value" of their names
and faces and to create effective markets in such goods.2"
The new tort quickly gained credibility (even if, as indicated
earlier, it has not necessarily been enshrined in the statutes or case
law of many states).26 One thing that helped, undoubtedly, was the
apparent imprimatur placed on the cause of action by the United
States Supreme Court two decades ago.27 I use the word "apparent"
24. 202 F.2d at 868.
25. Halpern, Independent Right, supra note 6; Halpem, Commercial
Exploitation, supranote 4.
26. Early on, the right of publicity received favorable treatment from two
extremely influential scholars. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954) [hereinafter Nimmer, Publicity]; Harry
Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law -- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 331 (1966) [hereinafter Kalven, Privacy].
27. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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because the facts of the only publicity rights case that the Court has
ever decided bear very little relationship to the kind of claim that is
normally the subject matter of right of publicity cases. It involved a
performer whose entire act -- lasting 15 seconds -- was filmed and
shown on television without his permission. Although the taking in
the case went far beyond the unconsented use of a name or a face -and it involved a news report rather than a commercial -- the Court
called the defendant's problem a violation of his right of publicity,
and went on to conclude that the cause of action was not barred by
the First Amendment.28 More will be said about this rather unusual
version of a publicity case at a later point. Suffice it to say for now
that Zacchini lent the right of publicity a legitimacy that undoubtedly
encouraged it to extend its reach.
The earliest publicity cases involved relatively straightforward
disputes over nonconsensual uses of the names or likenesses and
photographs of identifiable, famous people. Thus the subject matter
of publicity differed little from that involved in the older privacyappropriation cases. And, although they took more frequently to
calling the right a property interest, courts were slow to allow the
right to be exercised by anyone but the celebrity herself or to permit
its survival at her death.29 Gradually, however, the margins of the
right pushed outward. The range of attributes protected now extends
to such things as mannerisms and even catch phrases.3° People who

28. Id. Zacchini, however, was an odd "publicity" case, involving as it
did not the taking of name or appearance alone but the taking of an entire
performance. The plaintiff had developed an act in which he was shot from a
canon; the defendant videotaped the act and showed it, from start to finish, on
its news show. The Court said that the first amendment did not justify use of
someone's entire act without payment.
29. See, e.g., Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors. Etc., Inc.,
616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (holding that the
common law right of publicity was not descendible or devisable); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (1979) (same).
30. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir.), rehearingen banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
508 byU.S.
951Commons@DePaul,
(1993) (characteristics
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do not aspire to celebrity or treat it as their stock in trade are
nevertheless allowed to enjoy the same property interests in their
personality that could be exercised by a sports star or a famous
3
actress. 1
And the reluctance to allow the property right to survive the
subject's lifetime32 has also greatly eroded. Tennessee, a state that
pioneered survivability as an attribute of publicity claims, borrowed
an approach from trademark law that allows the right to endure, if
continuously exploited, in perpetuity.33 Indiana now protects
virtually anyone from unconsented commercial exploitations of his
or her personality for 100 years after the death of the individual in
question.34 Both Indiana and Oklahoma protect the publicity rights
not only of those who are now living, but of people who died long
establish claim); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831
(6th Cir. 1983) (catch phrase used to establish claim).
31. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) (under
Georgia law, a person has a property right in his or her personality without
regard to whether the individual is or is not a celebrity); IND. CODE ANN. § 3213-1-6 (Michie 1995) (a personality that has commercial value for any reason is
protected).
32. A discussion of the early cases on devisability and descendibility of
publicity rights can be found in Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity, and the Portrayalof Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L. J. 1577,
1618-20 (1979) [hereinafter Felcher & Rubin, Real People]. See also Peter L.
Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is
There CommercialLife After Death?, 89 YALE L. J. 1125 (1980).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (1997) provides that if the right is
exploited, it will remain in existence unless proof is provided that it has been
abandoned for two or more years.
34. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-8 (Michie 1995). The Indiana law
protects anyone whose personality has, or takes on after death, any commercial
value. Id. at § 32-13-1-6. Oklahoma has also extended protection for 100
years after death, 12 OKL. ST. ANN. §§ 1448-49 (1991), but to be covered, the
deceased's personality must have "commercial value at the time of his or her
death," id. at 1448(H), possibly -- but not assuredly -- making it a less expansive
statute than Indiana's.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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before their publicity statutes were passed,3" creating a windfall for
the heirs of numerous Americans who cast off their mortal coils
when the right of publicity was not even a glimmer in Jerome
Frank's eye.
Today courts seem willing to offer remedies for violations of
publicity rights even when what the defendant has utilized is not
literally an attribute of the protected persona. A series of highprofile federal court decisions from the Ninth Circuit illustrate the
point. Singer Bette Midler was held to have a cause of action for
violation of her publicity rights under California common law when
the defendant used a singer whose voice sounded like Midler's in an
advertisement for Ford cars.36
Vanna White was permitted to
object, on publicity grounds, when Samsung, in an advertisement for
electronics products, utilized a robot, clad in an evening gown and a
blond wig, in a witty evocation of White's current role as the hostess
of a famous game show.37 Actors have been permitted to sue over

35. 12 OKL. ST. ANN. § 1449 (1991) offers protection to anyone who has
died since Jan. 1, 1936, if the person's attributes had commercial value at the
time of her death. IND. CODE § 32-13-1-8 (Michie 1995) offers protection for
100 years after the death of the personality, including, apparently, anyone who
died within the past century.
36. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992). In Midler, a woman who had often performed as a
backup singer for the star was hired by Ford to sing one of Midler's hits, Do You
Want to Dance, in a commercial. Midler was ultimately awarded $400,000 in
damages for what was deemed to be a violation of her publicity rights. After
Midler, singer Tom Waits won a similar case involving a "sound alike." Waits
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080
(1993). Of course, imitation cases can involve deception -- an attempt, for
example, to convince the public that the voice they are hearing is actually that of
a Bette Midler or a Tom Waits. The criticism of the publicity rule is not meant
as tacit approval of deceptive practices, but only to suggest that actions based on
the act of imitation per se are problematic. An interesting case illustrating the
different issues that are presented by the publicity claim versis a "passing off'
claim is Allen v. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
37. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
(1993).
A gold
metallic robot, garbed
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the use by a defendant of fictional characters on the ground that, over
time, the live actors became inextricably identified in the public's
mind with the parts they were given to play. 8
The driving force behind this increasingly robust property right
in personality is a somewhat misplaced process of reasoning by
analogy.
Courts and commentators alike have conceived of
publicity rights as a common law interest justified by the same
principles that led Congress (and the drafters of the Constitution
before it) to want to protect writings and invehtions with copyrights
and patents.39 The United States Supreme Court in Zacchini
shown in the advertisement flipping letters on a game board in what was
purported to be a look into the next century.
38. Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger played characters in the popular
television program, Cheers. Paramount Pictures Corp. decided to license bars
designed to look like the set of Cheers; included was permission to create
robotic figures representing the characters "Norm" and "Cliff." Although the
robots were not based on Wendt and Ratzenberger's actual appearance, the
Court found that the robots sufficiently evoked the two actors to violate their
property interests in their personas. For an interesting comment on the case, and
its effect on the rights of the owners of the copyrights in the actual scripts, see
Daniel Margolis, Note, Cheers to the Church Lady: Resolving the Conflict
between Copyright and the Right ofPublicity, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 627. A
recent case from the Third Circuit, McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir.
1994), also recognized that publicity rights violations could arise out of the link
between an actor and a fictional character. However, factual differences
between the two cases make McFarlandless clearly than Wendt a decision that
pushes out the boundaries of the law. In McFarland,a New Jersey restaurant
calling itself "Spanky McFarland's" was sued by the actor who played the role
of Spanky in the "Our Gang" films in the 1930s. Actual photographs of the
child actors in their roles as Little Rascals were hung on the restaurant's walls,
id. at 916, and the name "McFarland," id. at 914, was both that of the fictional
character Spanky and of the actor who played him. Thus, one line of argument
in the case was that George McFarland's actual name and face had been
appropriated.
39. One of the clearest statements of this rationale, in language with a
familiar ring for copyright scholars, came from Melville Nimmer, who stated
that publicity values required "considerable time, effort, skill, and even money"
to develop. Nimmer, Publicity, supra note 26, at 216. Professor Nimmer went
on to urge adoption of the right, saying that it is "an axiom of the most 14
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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explained that, if Mr. Zacchini's claim was allowed to survive a first
amendment challenge, in the long run the public would get more,
rather than less, information because those who devoted themselves
to creative enterprises would be able "to reap the reward of [their]
endeavors ....,,4 Recognizing the public goods problem41 presented
by intellectual products, the Court reasoned that only through state
intervention to create artificial exclusivity through a property right
could creators like Mr. Zacchini recapture the investment made in
their work and earn sufficient profit to encourage them to continue to
produce.4"
Zacchini was an odd publicity case, however, because, unlike
most of them, it involved information in a form that was closely akin

fundamental nature, that every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless
there are important countervailing public policy considerations." Id. For a
discussion of the use of similar reasoning in copyright cases, see Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665,
690-93 (1992) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Information as Speech].
40. Zacchini,433 U.S. at 573.
41. A public good is one which is capable of use by any number of
persons without diminishing the quantity available for use by others.
Individuals or entities that create such goods are unable, absent the intervention
of law, to establish markets once the good is made publicly available, and thus
cannot recapture the costs of production. See Landes & Posner, Economic
Analysis, supra note 5, at 326.
42. Other courts took up the same theme in subsequent opinions. One of
the more eloquent judicial statements of this justification for recognizing a right
of publicity appears in the dissent by then Chief Justice Rose Bird in Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441-43 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The
California legislature subsequently sided with Chief Justice Bird by passing a
right of publicity statute, recognizing the right as alienable and providing, as she
had suggested, id. at 446, for the interest to expire 50 years after the death of the
individual. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1998). The durational provision is
modelled after that used, until recently, in the federal copyright law. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (1976)(Copyrights have recently been extended to the author's life plus
70 years, see infra note 44.)
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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to the sorts of works of authorship protected by copyright.43 An
entire act by a particular performer has an expressive specificity that
is in some senses like that of a television program or a book chapter.
By contrast, most publicity cases involve a name or a face or a
resemblance that is used, in the way individual words or colors and
patterns are used, as a building block of expression rather than as the
end product. The merits of the Court's decision to treat Zacchini's
act under a copyright model cannot be done justice here. The point I
would make, however, is that a rationale that may have made sense
on the special facts of Zacchini has been drafted for a lot of heavy
lifting in situations pretty far afield from those facts. The argument
that mental labor and inventiveness will cease unless they are
encouraged and rewarded by property interests in the results is now
the engine that drives us (even when the rationale seems wholly
without a basis) to want to protect Vanna White against imitation by
a robot, to guard the estate of Martin Luther King against the
marketing of plastic busts of the late civil rights leader, and, indeed,
to invent any number of other new rights in information and
intellectual pursuits in addition to those that have to do with
publicity values."
43. In fact, Chapter 11 of the current Copyright Act now contains a
provision closely akin to the kind of protection involved in Zacchini. It
prohibits unauthorized video and audio recording of acts by musical performers.

17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1996).
44.

A few examples of new or expanded property protections recently

passed or currently on the agenda of the United States Congress include: a bill to
create property rights in the contents of factual databases, see, e.g., H.R. 354,
106 t' Cong. (1999); an Act that prohibits efforts to defeat technological
monitoring and anticopying devices employed to prevent unauthorized use of
digitally transmitted information (without regard to whether the information so
protected is covered by copyright), Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); and legislation to extend the term of
copyrights by twenty years, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). Until 1978, copyright lasted for a term
of 28 years, but could be renewed by the author or a statutory successor for a
second 28 year term. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 1, 24. The term was extended
to life plus 50 years by the Copyright Act of 1976, effective January 1, 1978, 17
U.S.C. § 302 (1976). The new legislation extends the term to life plus 70. Pub.
L. No. 105-298, § 102(b)(1), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). Modifications have also 16
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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Indeed, we live in the era when intellectual property has became
king of the hill. Lawmakers and creative individuals alike
increasingly treat as received truth the contestable intuition that
producers of intellectual products should have a "right" to any
income stream their labor can generate. They label as immoral and
self-serving counterarguments that, except in narrowly tailored
circumstances, intangible intellectual contributions with value to the
public should be freely appropriable." This pro-property mind-set
has been further encouraged by the gradual recognition that income
from intellectual property makes up a very significant part of the
United States' balance of payments in the international trade arena46 .
In short, a claimant who says that someone is "stealing" his
intellectual labor is making an assertion of greater attractiveness to
been proposed to the Uniform Commercial Code that would permit creators of
intellectual property to craft their own set of restrictions on the use of their work
by means of nonnegotiable shrinkwrap contracts. Enforcement of the private
restrictions would be provided under state law. See e.g., American Law
Institute, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B Licenses § 2B-106 &
Comments, 2B-111 & Comments (Tent. Draft April 15, 1998). See also, ProCD
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding validity of a shrinkwrap
license under existing contract law). Manufacturers of useful goods who for
years have been unsuccessful in convincing Congress or the courts to provide
significant protection for their unpatented product designs under copyright or
through separate design legislation have begun to convince judges to fashion
redress under the auspices of trademark law. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (design does not need to take on secondary meaning
to be protected under federal trademark law).
45. Commentators have given a number of economic and fairness
arguments for allowing originators to appropriate all the value they create. For
a discussion of them, see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Association, 95 F.3d 959, 971-76 (10th Cir. 1996). All the arguments depend at
some level on the express or tacit assumption that the plaintiff is entitled to a
property interest.
46. Intellectual property accounts for at least a quarter of the dollar value
of exports from the United States. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Diane L.
Zimmerman, Convenors' Introduction: The Culture and Economics of
Participationin an International Intellectual Property Regime, 29 J. INTER.
LAW & POLS. 1, 2 (1996-97).
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the modem legal ear than someone who makes the counter-argument
that all these property claims are diminishing the ability of others to
express themselves.
Thus, the expanding right of publicity is a piece of a larger trend
that has elicited negative comment from a wide range of scholars
alarmed at seeing intellectual property rights gradually colonizing
more and more of the informational commons.47 Given these
developments, it seems unfair to characterize as odd, idiosyncratic or
outdated the interest members of the academic community have
shown in trying to reinsert concern over the value of preserving the
public domain back into the conversation about publicity rights.
Skepticism about making publicity a "right" grows out of an
intuition quite contrary to the one sketched out above48 -- although
one that has itself historically been central to the framework of
federal copyright law4 9 -- that a society cannot have a vigorous
intellectual, political and social existence unless it can generate and
exchange information with a minimum of financial, legal or
procedural barriers. Or, to put it a bit differently, a society that
47. It is impossible to chronicle all the literature criticizing expansionary
approaches to intellectual property protection. A few recent examples include
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REv. 51 (1997 (warning against aggressive protection of databases);
Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 29
(1994) (criticizing proposals for changes in the copyright laws that would make
browsing documents on the internet a copyright violation).
48. For a clear statement of the contrary intuition -- that intellectual
property rights should extend no farther than necessary to induce continued
production of desired goods -- see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) [hereinafter, Breyer, The Uneasy
Case].
49. The structure of copyright law in the Anglo-American tradition
represents a carefully crafted compromise. Copyright protects the author's
original expression of an idea, conception or fact but not the idea, conception or
fact itself. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1998). Thus anyone else is invited to use the same
content, expressed in her own way, without having to negotiate with owners of
copyrights to do so.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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places a high value on intellectual ferment and on the development
of its human resources cannot achieve those goals while at the same
time permitting unlimited commodification and privatization of
information. 0
But I would like to go a step further and argue that how far to
privatize the public domain is not solely a debatable question of
intellectual property policy as to which reasonable people could
disagree. There are limits beyond which commodification simply
cannot go because at some point depredations on the public domain
become a violation of freedom of speech." This brings me, at last,
back to Judge Kozinski's interpretation of the first amendment and to
the central subject of this essay.

III. NEWSWORTHINESS, COMMERICALISM AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

The right of publicity puts the power of the state behind private
individuals who want to control whether and how information about
important people -- for example, what they are called, or how they
look, or how they sound -- can be used by other people.52 Publicity
50. For two insightful examinations of the role and importance of the
public domain, see Lange, Public Domain, supra note 21; Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMoRY L.J. 965 (1990).
51. I began to think systematically about the interface between intellectual
property and the first amendment several years ago. At the time, I was struck by
the fact that courts that normally were very protective of free speech took a
quite different stance -- discounting or ignoring damage to a defendant's speech
interests -- if the dispute could successfully be characterized as one designed to
protect the plaintiffs property rights. This led to an ongoing project designed to
explore the first amendment implications of creating literal markets in
information, of which this paper is a part. See, generally, Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, supra note 39.
52. A similar point is made by Michael Madow in his 1993 critique of
publicity rights. Madow writes:
What it comes down to, then, is that the power to license is
the power to suppress. When the law gives a celebrity a right
of publicity,
it does more 2016
than funnel additional income her
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rights, in other words, are a kind of content-based regulation of
speech. The implications of that observation, I would like to
suggest, have not been adequately confronted by proponents of the
right of publicity.
A. TraditionalApproaches to Accommodating Publicityand
FirstAmendment Rights.
I do not mean to suggest that supporters of publicity rights have
ignored the possibility that the first amendment limits the right of
publicity. They have not. Most of the major writings on the subject
contain elaborate exegeses on the nature and extent of the limitations
that must be placed on the right to accommodate competing interests
in free speech. 3 As a general rule, the legal dividing line that has
been accepted by scholars, courts and legislators alike is one that
way. It gives her (or her assignee) a substantial measure of
power over the production and circulation of meaning and
identity in our society: power, if she so chooses, to suppress
readings or appropriations of her persona that depart from,
challenge, or subvert the meaning she prefers....
Madow, Popular Culture, supra note 4, at 145. Although defenders of the
publicity right would not necessarily agree that the tort has this property, the
same conclusion is implicit in an observation made in the opening sentences of a
recent article supporting publicity. Roberta Kwall points out, "No country in
the world is so driven by personality as is the United States. Fame is used to
persuade, inspire, and inform Americans in nearly every aspect of their lives. As
a group, Americans are fascinated not only with the concept of fame, but also
with those who embody its essence." Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND.
L.J. 1, 1 (1997) [hereinafter Kwall, Fame].
53. This is not an attempt to be exhaustive but rather to give a few examples
of scholars who have been supporters of the right of publicity, while at the same
time expressing concern about first amendment interests: J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, §

8.6 (Rev. 1998); McCarthy, The

Human Persona,supra note 6, at 131; Halpem, Independent Right, supra note 6,
at 867-69; Kwall, Propertyand Liability, supra note 5 (passim); Felcher & Rubin,
ReaLPeople, supra note 32 (passim); cf Note, Right of Publicity Tarnishment and
the FirstAmendment, 73 WASH. L. REV. 223 (1998) (proposing that the property
interest in publicity be given legal protection against tarnishment by "offensive or
degrading associations" to the extent consistent with the first amendment).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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separates out and privileges those uses of information about
individuals that are "newsworthy;" liability is reserved only for uses
that are "commercial" in nature.5 4
Over the past hundred years, in privacy and then in publicity
law, the concept of newsworthiness has served as a surrogate for a
finding that the defendant's activity is protected by the first
amendment. Thus, a magazine does not need Bette Midler's
permission to publish an article about her because communicating
something of public concern to its readers is a "newsworthy" use.
The defense will be recognized even though the star might be able to
prove that the use of her name, and perhaps of her picture, on the
magazine cover induced hundreds or even thousands of fans who
might otherwise never have read the particular publication to
purchase copies. The shelter offered by the newsworthiness
privilege means that Midler is entitled neither to enjoin the
magazine's use of her name and face nor to share in the revenues that
her fame helps to generate.55

54. A provision in the California right of publicity statute is typical of this kind
of line-drawing:
For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news,
public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political
campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is
required....
CAL. CIv. CODE § 9900) (West 1998). For comparable provisions in the law of
other states, see, e.g., IND. STAT. § 32-13-1-1(b)-(c) (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §
597.790(2)(a)-(g) (1997).
The use of the commercial/noncommercial dividing line has not enjoyed
universal approbation, however. Professor Kwall has criticized it, arguing instead
for the substitution of a balancing test in all cases except those involving factual
accounts. Kwall, Property andLiability, supra note 5.
55. But see, Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 1999 WL 38490 (C.D.
Cal., Jan. 20, 1999)(actor's publicity rights violated by use of his image in
article on fashion).
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But if the defendant's appropriation of Ms. Midler's identifying
characteristics is classified as commercial, states have considered
themselves free to choose, as a matter of public policy, to give the
star the legal power both to control and to benefit financially from
uses of her persona. The reason for this difference seems to rest
almost entirely on the fact that commercial speech was not deemed
worthy of first amendment protection at the time that the law
governing appropriations of personality began to develop.
When courts and legislatures began to experiment with tort law
protections for personal privacy early in the twentieth century,56 they
quickly recognized that the common law could easily run afoul of
the first amendment. However much courts and legislators might
sympathize with someone who did not want to be the subject of a
news story because she preferred to exercise her "right to be let
alone,"57 giving legal force to her preference was the equivalent of
authorizing her to act as a censor, able to control how much the
public could learn about her role in events of social, historical or
political significance. Although legal analysis in support of the
distinction was sketchy," fairly broad agreement was reached early
56. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewellto Warren
and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 292-302 (1983)
[hereinafter Zimmerman, Privacy] (discussing development of privacy rights
following its origins in 1890 law review article).
57. This phrase is attributed to Thomas Cooley. Samuel Warren & Louis
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890) (quoting
THOMAS COOLEY, LAW OF TORTs 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
58. In their famous law review article advocating the creation of a privacy
right, Warren and Brandeis acknowledged a quite narrow defense of
newsworthiness. Id. at 214-16. Courts, however, tended to be more generous in
finding events and the roles people played in them newsworthy. See, e.g., Jones v.
Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1929) (wife of murder victim has no privacy
right with regard to accounts of husband's death); Jacova v. Southern Radio &
Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (bystander who played no role in the
event is nonetheless newsworthy). The division of speech into the newsworthy
and the commercial occurred without extensive discussion in the cases. By the
1960s, courts tended to treat any connection with an actual happening that could
conceivably interest the public sufficient to satisfy the newsworthiness criterion.
Kalven, Privacy,supra note 26, at 336.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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on that privacy interests did not rise to a sufficient level of
importance to outweigh the defendant's right to engage in
communication of newsworthy information because the latter
interest was protected by the constitution.
However, giving a plaintiff the right to complain about
unconsented uses of personal information in nonnewsworthy
contexts -- also referred to as "commercial" uses -- was perceived as
posing no comparable constitutional problems. A number of early
cases involving what were deemed commercial uses arose from
advertisements that featured the names or faces of ordinary people
who did not desire that form of notoriety. 9 But courts also often
categorized as commercial a variety of nonadvertising uses,
including those in fiction and in entertainments." These were also
assumed to involve unprotected, or sub-constitutional, forms of
speech.61 As a result, the tort we now know as commercial
59. Georgia was the earliest state to draw this distinction in its case law.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (use of plaintiffs
name and face to advertise insurance invades his privacy). The New York Court
of Appeals refused to act on its own to create a new common law right of privacy
of any kind, Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902),
but the legislature subsequently passed a law making appropriation of names or
likenesses for purposes of trade or business a tort. Act of April 6, 1903, ch. 132,
§§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified at N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1997)). Other early court decisions recognizing invasions of privacy in the context
of advertisements include: Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918) (plaintiffs
picture used in advertisement for drygoods store); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W.
1076 (Mo. App. 1911) (plaintiffs photograph used to advertise jewelry business);
Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (drug company
enjoined from using Thomas Edison's name in its advertising).
60. See, e.g., Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913)
(works intended to entertain rather than inform are "commercial" uses); Leverton
v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (same); Hazlitt v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953) (same); Mau v. Rio Grande
Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (same).
61. The distinction, for constitutional purposes, between commercial and noncommercial speech was formally recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech outside the
protection of the first amendment).
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appropriation became the branch of the common law of privacy with
the greatest vitality because allowing recovery for it did not seem
fraught with constitutional peril.62
As the United States Supreme
Court gradually evolved its modem understanding of the first
amendment, however, it became clear that the earlier distinction
between newsworthy and nonnewsworthy was a semantically
inadequate way to explain what constituted protected and
unprotected speech. For example, the Court made it clear that
speech designed to entertain, including fiction, was entitled to first
amendment protection, even though it was not intended to convey
news or factual information.63 A somewhat vaguely defined
category labelled commercial speech continued, however, along with
fighting words and obscenity,' to be constitutionally unprotected.
The development of the tort law of appropriation, however, did
not track these developments carefully, and as a result, its path
gradually, if subtly, diverged from that taken by evolving first
amendment analysis.
Appropriation continued to rely on
newsworthiness as the surrogate for free speech interests, and to
include under the category of commercial (or unprivileged) speech
62. The tort law of privacy was sorted by Prosser into four categories, William
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960), and enshrined in that form in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §

652a (1977). Two branches of the tort -- public exposure of private embarrassing
facts and false light invasions of privacy -- have been severely limited by

constitutional privileges. See Zimmerman, supra note 56, Privacy (wrongful
public exposure of private embarrassing facts); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed,64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364
(1989) (false light invasions of privacy). A third, intrusion, seems to be
comparatively uncommon but is typically redressed when it is proven. A number
of high profile decisions, however, have called attention in recent years to the
potential of the intrusion tort to impede newsgathering. See Jeffrey Grossman,
Note, FirstAmendment Implications of Tort Liability for News-Gathering, 1996
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 583 (1998).

63. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures are
protected speech even though designed to entertain); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507 (1948) (entertainment entitled to first amendment protection).
64. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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any uses, including but not limited to advertising, that, in the
judgment of courts, were more about making profits than about
imparting important information to the public. As Haelen clearly
shows, when Judge Frank created the right of publicity out of
appropriation's rib (to borrow an apt image from Professor J.
Thomas McCarthy), he simply imported this rather generous
definition of commercial uses into the new tort. The case, after all,
was not about advertising, but about baseball cards that were
packaged with chewing gum. Baseball cards were a product
premium designed to induce consumers to buy gum, but they clearly
served that function only because they had an independent
communicative value for the millions of kids who collected and
traded them. Judge Frank, relying on the tradition that grew up
under appropriation, did not, however, waiver for a moment before
categorizing the cards as commercial rather than newsworthy speech
65
because they "promoted" the sale of gum.
As long as one could maintain the position that the
appropriation tort and its sibling right of publicity regulated only
speech that was unprotected anyway, no particularly incisive
justifications had to be given for commodifying attributes of
personality in this way or for conceding the legitimacy of the state's
interest in doing so. As recently as 1979, the authors of a leading
article on publicity and privacy rights were still able to say with
assurance that, "The unauthorized use of a person's attributes to
create or sell a product ...
will typically lie outside the scope of First
Amendment protection and thus will often incur liability."66
B. Reconsiderationof FirstAmendment Analysis in Light of
Modern Law on CommercialSpeech.
The changes in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the first
amendment in the past twenty years, however, are so major that they
require us to revisit the ostensibly settled principles of law in
commercial appropriation and publicity with a more critical eye.
65. Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir), cert. denied,346 U.S. 816 (1953).
66. Felcher & Rubin, Real People,supra note 32, at 1606.
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Beginning in 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,67 the Court began to redefine the
meaning of protected speech. Commercial speech no longer lay
outside the first amendment; it was protected, the Court concluded -albeit to a lesser degree than, say, political or literary and scientific
speech.
This change seemed to have little impact on the torts of
appropriation or publicity. Courts and commentators appear to
assume (if indeed they think about the issue at all) that even if
commercial speech now gets some protection, it does not get enough
of it either to foreclose recognition of appropriation and the right of
publicity or to narrow the circumstances under which these interests
can successfully be asserted. 8
This assumption, I would argue, is not warranted. In at least
two important ways, the Court's contemporary commercial speech
cases raise doubts about the viability of significant aspects of both
torts. For one thing, the tort law of publicity and appropriation treats
as commercial, and hence freely regulable, a lot of speech that under
the Supreme Court's current first amendment analysis seems clearly
to be fully protected by the constitution. Secondly, recent opinions
by a number of justices have raised serious doubt about the
continued viability of allowing the state to prohibit or restrict
commercial speech, at least when the communications in question
are truthful ones. Whether or not accurate commercial speech is
eventually treated as indistinguishable in constitutional terms from
political or literary speech -- a real possibility -- the Court as a whole
has shown itself in recent years increasingly unlikely to accept
regulatory rationales and approaches that are less than rigorous in
their logic.
67. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
68. Professor Halpern has written that the right of publicity survives
constitutional scrutiny because it protects "the hard economic commercial value of
an individual's identity" and not simply because courts take "a formulaic approach
to commercial speech." Halpem, Independent Right, supra note 6, at 868.
Professor Halper does not develop the point, however, and indeed it is unclear
why "commercial value" is entitled to the heavy weight he attributes to it.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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1. Profit does not make speech commercial.
Let us start with the first point. Although the vast bulk of
publicity and appropriation cases have been brought against
advertisers who use elements of individual identity without
permission, many nonadvertising cases continue to be labelled
commercial.69 The use of famous faces as the subject of plastic
busts, 70 or to decorate posters, the fronts of t-shirts, the sides of
pencil sharpeners, and the surfaces of drinking glasses have been
lumped together with advertising into the commercial use category.71
Although there have been cases where merchandise bearing a name
or face has been treated as protected speech -- for example, when the
face at issue is that of a political candidate72 -- the usual legal
69. Two recent and highly publicized instances of nonadvertising cases were
brought by film star Dustin Hoffinan, and by golfer Tiger Woods. Hoffmi-an was
awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages because a magazine, in a fashion
article, superimposed Hoffman's head on the body of a woman dressed in high
heels and a gown. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 1999 WL 38490 (C.D.
Cal., January 20, 1999). The judge subsequently awarded the actor an additional
$1.5 million in punitive damages. David Rozenweig, Judge Doubles L.A.
Magazine's Damages in Dustin Hoffman Suit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at B3.
The company that "markets" Tiger Woods sued sports artist Rick Rush for
publicity rights violations based on Rush's use of Woods' physical appearance in a
picture showing "golf greats." Marcia Chambers, Lawsuit Pits Artists' Rights vs.
Athletes', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at Dl. Another striking and troubling
example is Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1988), holding that
because a famous photograph of a sailor kissing a nurse on VJ Day in 1945 was
now being sold for $1600 a copy, the defendants use was for commercial
purposes.
70. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products, Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (1lth Cir. 1983).
71. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P. 2d 425 (Cal. 1979), for example, the
publicity claim by Lugosi's heirs was triggered by agreements to market Lugosi's
image as Count Dracula on "plastic toy Pencil Sharpeners, Plastic model figures,
T-shirts and sweat shirts, card games, soap and detergent products, picture puzzles,
candy dispensers, masks, kites, belts and belt buckles, and beverage stirring rods."
Plaintiffs ultimately lost because the Court refused to find the interest descendible.
72. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S. 2d 501, 507-08 (Sup. Ct.
1968). For a more recent and important case involving a parodic version of
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analysis focuses on the motives of the manufacturer in making the
goods (to make a profit) rather than on why the goods are purchased
by consumers. And, at the most questionable fringe of so-called
commercial uses, are instances where entertainers have been
sanctioned for putting together performances in which they have
attempted to mimic the appearance and other attributes of celebrities
(including dead celebrities).73
These claims have always been legally troubling, although they
have continued to be recognized.74 While it is certainly true that
makers of t-shirts and imitative performers are in business to make a
profit, so, too are virtually all those who distribute clearly privileged
communicative works -- including newspaper publishers and
broadcasters. Magazines and other media are not in existence purely
as the expression on their publishers' part of an idealistic, selfsacrificing belief in the value of an informed public.7'

baseball cards, see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95
F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). The court in Cardtoons found that the defendant's
cards violated the Oklahoma statutory right of publicity, but concluded that the
application of the statute to baseball cards, which are fully protected by the first
amendment, was unconstitutional. Hopefully, two recent disputes over publicity
rights involving a magazine article and an artist's rendering will also ultimately be
resolved in a similar way. See note 69, supra.
73. These cases do not involve consumer deception because viewers of the
performances are not misled into believing that what they are watching is actually
a reincarnation, say, of Elvis Presley. One fairly recent example of this genre of
cases can be found in Apple Corps Limited v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342
(M.D. Tenn. 1993). In Apple Corps, a group of musicians were sued, and
ultimately enjoined from continuing to put on shows attempting to recreate Beatles
concerts from the 1960s, on the ground that their work was purely commercial
exploitation. They were also barred from continuing to use posters picturing them
as Beatles "look-alikes." See also, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339 (D.N.J. 1981)(banning imitator of Elvis Presley from putting on a show
entitled "A Tribute to Elvis").
74. See sources cited in note 73, supra.
75. One of the very few judicial decisions that have refused to recognize a
publicity right in information-bearing merchandise emphasized the lack of a
principled basis for distinguishing these materials from ones that deserve full first
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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Furthermore, the mere fact that information appears on a
utilitarian object does not deprive it of its identity as speech. Many
products carry such significant communicative freight that they are
clearly purchased by consumers for what they "say" rather than for
what they do.76 In fact, many of these so-called products -- be they
commemorative buttons, baseball cards, posters, or shows put on by
celebrity impersonators -- actually have no functional purpose at all.
Others -- mugs or t-shirts -- do, but someone who wants to wear
Tom Hanks' face on his or her chest surely views the t-shirt that
carries the image as a secondary and relatively unimportant
component of the package. The use of these kinds of images to
associate oneself with an era or an attitude toward life or the
adoration of a "hero" or celebrity77 is difficult to distinguish
intellectually from the impulses that back in the 1960's led Mr.
Cohen to wear his jacket with the logo "Fuck the Draft" into the
courthouse78 or young Mr. Tinker79 to go to school with a black
armband on.8"
amendment protection. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95
F.3d 959, 968-70 (10th Cir. 1996).
76. The district court in Friends of the Viet Nam Veterans Memorial v.
Kennedy, 984 F. Supp 18, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'd on othergrounds, 116 F.3d
495 (D.C.Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1035 (1998) rejected a total ban on
the sale of t-shirts on the Washington Mall. The court said that t-shirts were not
commercial speech, but rather an important form of communication. Although the
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the issue was not speech but selling
things on the mall, it agreed that the plaintiffs were using the t-shirts to call
attention to their ideas. 116 F.3d at 497.
77. The way in which individuals give meaning to, and extract meaning from,
the images of celebrities is thoroughly explored in two excellent articles that are,
overall, quite critical of publicity rights. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity,
supra note 21; Madow, Popular Culture, supra note 4. Although she mounts an
useful defense against the attacks on publicity rights by Coombe and Madow,
Professor Kwall nonetheless would seem to concede, at least tacitly, that the public
does indeed use celebrities and their attributes for important expressive purposes.
See Kwall, Fame, supra note 52 at 1 (celebrity used to "persuade, inspire and
inform" public).
78. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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Unless some better reason than a quest for profit can be posited
for treating communicative products and mimicry as less protected
commercial speech, it is hard to see why the producers of these
goods should be treated as any less engaged in highly protected
activities than are newspaper publishers or motion picture producers.
In truth, these sorts of products and performances do not seem
to fit in well at all with the kinds of communicative material the
Supreme Court currently relegates to its less-favored commercial
speech category. Admittedly, the Court has not ever been required
to give definitive meaning to the term "commercial speech." But a
careful reading of the decisions indicates that the justices are
unwilling to define the term capaciously, fearing that to do so would
erode the presumption of protection that ordinarily applies to any but
exceptional instances of speech. On several occasions, the justices
have suggested that the commercial speech doctrine applies only to
speech which proposes a commercial transaction -- i.e., an
advertisement for a product or service.8 Speech is not commercial
merely because it is associated with a product or because it is

79. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
80. Although it is true that in both Cohen and Tinker, the speech at issue was
overtly political and hence self-evidently entitled to full first amendment
protection, much of the association with celebrities and stars that occurs in the
right of publicity cases also carries a political message, albeit more subtle. And, in
any event, political speech does not exhaust the category of fuly protected speech.

See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (acknowledging that a film
about personal relationships was fully protected speech).
81. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423
(1993); Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 473-74 (1989); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65-68
(1983). The Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc.,

95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996), cited the Supreme Courfs cases as its basis for
concluding that, "Cardtoons' [baseball] trading cards...are not commercial speech-they do not merely advertise another unrelated product. Although the cards are
sold in the marketplace, they are not transformed into commercial speech merely
because they are sold for profit."
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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originated
by some person or entity seeking to make a profit from
2
8

it.

In short, first amendment doctrine does not provide an easy out
for courts that want to continue to categorize Elvis posters and Elvis
imitations as forms of commercial speech. This observation, I
would argue, means that they will need to come up with a much
different kind of justification than has previously been given if they
want to continue treating these forms of communicative material as
anything less than fully privileged.83 One place to look for help
82. The Supreme Court has indicated, in a number of instances, its concern
with keeping commercial speech narrowly confined. For example, it has refused
to find the form of a communication dispositive of its identity as commercial or
fully protected speech. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (use of paid
advertisement to communicate information about abortion services does not render
the communication a form of commercial speech). Similarly, in Lowe v. SEC,
472 U.S. 181 (1985), the Court rejected the governmenfs effort to argue that an
investment adviser was engaging in commercial speech by distributing his advice
to customers in a newsletter. The Justices have also been unwilling to allow
regulation of concededly commercial speech where it is inextricably mixed with
fully protected speech. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983). The distinction between commercial and
noncommercial, however, continues on occasion to lead the lower courts into
murky waters. In one recent decision, a federal district court judge refused to
enjoin enforcement of an anti-noise ordinance. The plaintiffs' ice cream trucks
played music as they drove through the streets. The judge conceded that music
was ordinarily protected speech but classified it in this instance as commercial
because the sound of it served "as an invitation to sale" of ice cream. Anabell's Ice
Cream Corp. v. Town of Glocester, 925 F. Supp. 920, 926-27 (D.R.I. 1996).
83. In Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1981), the
district court recognized that entertainment was protected by the first amendment.
The judge classified the performance of a Presley impersonator as unprotected,
however, because the production functioned "primarily as a means of commercial
exploitation," rather than "providing the free expression of creative talent which
contributes to society's cultural enrichment." Id. at 1356. It did so, he said,
because copying and imitating, even if they require considerable talent, lack both a
"creative component" and significant social value. Id. at 1359. This approach,
more conclusory than explanatory, has, nonetheless, been adopted by other courts.
See, e.g., Apple Corps Limited v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342, 347 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993).
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might be Zacchini8 4 which did, after all, uphold a publicity claim
even though the use at issue -- a news program -- was clearly
communicative. But I do not believe that Zacchini comes close to
justifying the proposition that rights of publicity can be sustained
even when the expression at issue is traditional first amendment
speech. First of all, Mr. Zacchini was not asking to be paid for his
name, or his face, or the sound of his voice or because someone
copied his act; he wanted compensation for the broadcast of his
entire performance. In the background, invisible but felt, was the
specter of sports teams and entertainers who, had Zacchini lost,
would have been vulnerable to losing large chunks of their paying
audiences as a consequence of unauthorized broadcasting. If
newscasters could film whole games or shows without either
permission or payment merely by asserting that they were
"informing the public," producers of live events would no longer be
able to recover part of their costs through the sale of such rights and,
as a result, might lose much of their incentive to continue putting
them on.
Furthermore, Zacchini did not care if the newscast showed his
performance; he only cared that he was not paid. But typically,
plaintiffs in right of publicity or appropriation cases want to control
whether or by whom their images can be used and may, therefore, be
after injunctive as well as monetary relief. Bette Midler, for
example, was angered by the use of a sound-alike in the Ford
advertisement in part because, she said, she did not do
advertisements." The majority in Zacchini stressed that one reason
it was willing to allow the plaintiff to prevail was because money
was all he wanted; he did not ask for the more troubling relief of a
prior restrain than would enable him to control or censor the use of
84 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
85. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 951 (1992). A similar argument was made, successfully, in a recent case
brought by Dustin Hoffinan. In the Hoffman case, however, editorial content
rather than an advertisement was at issue. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
1999 WL 38490 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 20, 1999). In Hoffman, though, the harm was
from a nonrecurring use, and only damages were at issue.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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his performance. 6 In sum, Zacchini is far too narrow a holding to
carry on its back all the right of publicity claims against materials
that are something other that promotions for products or services.
2. Are all advertisements less favored speech?
But even for publicity and appropriation cases that involve
traditional advertising, the evolution of the commercial speech
doctrine would seem to pose commonly unrecognized obstacles to
the continued health of the torts. The reason these cases have
typically been easy ones for plaintiffs to win is that defendants'
countervailing free speech interests, although no longer nonexistent,
have continued to be treated reflexively as if they are at least weak.
But this is not a safe assumption.
In the first place, speech designed to sell something can, at least
on some occasions, be interwoven with subject matter that may
demand a more nuanced and protective response to publicity claims
by the courts. The most commonly recognized instance is
advertising designed to sell materials such as newspapers, books and
magazines. A celebrity may appear in an advertisement for a
magazine because a recent edition of the publication contained a
story about her; although a law suit may follow, courts tend to treat
these uses as constitutionally privileged "incidental uses." 7
Less often acknowledged, however, is the fact that promotional
advertising may sometimes use attributes of a well-known person to
introduce into the advertisement a note of social or political
commentary. Arguably, this was what Samsung was doing with its
Vanna White robot. The mere fact that the speech proposes a
commercial transaction ought not automatically tip the balance in

86. 433 U.S. at 573-74. Injunctions are viewed as prior restraints, a form of
relief that cuts off speech before it can occur. Prior restraints have always been the
most suspect form of regulation the state can engage in under the first amendment.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
87. See, e.g., Berkos v. NBC, 515 N.E.2d 668 (Ill.App. 1987) (use in "teasers"
for news show not appropriation); Velez v. VV Publishing Corp., 524 N.Y.S.2d
186 (App.Div. 1988) (photograph of plaintiff used in advertisement for Village
Voice a protected incidental use).
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favor of the plaintiff.88 Recognition of this point can be found in a
recent Second Circuit case. The mayor of New York City asked the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) to take an
advertisement off city buses because it "misappropriated" the
mayor's name, in violation of state law, for commercial purposes."
The MTA complied,9" and the advertiser sued for, and won, a
preliminary injunction. On appeal, the federal court affirmed. The
majority concluded that the MTA's action constituted a prior
restraint.91 It then went on to say that, although the Supreme Court
has left open the possibility that prior restraints might be permissible
where commercial speech was involved, the circuit court could not
sanction such an approach. "This case," said the court, "aptly
demonstrates that where there are both commercial and political
elements present in speech, even the determination whether speech is
commercial or not may be fraught with ambiguity... ,,92
But even where the content of the advertisement is purely
promotional, the status of many publicity claims is uncertain.
Although the Supreme Court has consistently said that false or
misleading advertisement can be subject to regulation without much
concern for free speech defenses, the same cannot so clearly be said
of truthful advertising. Since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
88. See, e.g., Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487
U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988) (when commercial speech inextricably intertwined with
fully protected speech, cannot use lower level of scrutiny of government

regulation).
89. New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 136 F.3d

123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 68 (1998). The legend on the advertisement
for the magazine said, "Possibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't

taken credit for." Id. at 125.
90. The MTA, several years before this dispute arose, had adopted a set of
standards governing its acceptance of advertising. The standards prohibited the
display of advertisements that violated state laws prohibiting commercial
misappropriation. Id. at 126.

91. Id. at 131.
92. Id.
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Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,Inc.93 was decided in 1976, the
Court has vacillated over whether or not accurate commercial
speech, like most other protected speech, should be subject to
regulation only upon a showing of a compelling state interest. That
is to say, it has struggled to decide if accurate commercial speech
should be entitled to the same degree of protection as a newspaper
story.
Although the tale of that struggle is a long one and has been told
in greater detail elsewhere, I will attempt to sketch it briefly here.
Virginia State Board, the Court's first full-fledged effort to confront
the status of commercial speech, agreed that the government could
subject such speech to time, place and manner regulations and
restrict it if it was false, misleading or proposed an illegal activity.
But the Court intimated that if the speech were truthful and
promoted a legal product or activity, it might well be fully protected
by the first amendment. Subsequently, attempts to regulate accurate
commercial speech were regularly struck down.94
In 1980, however, the Court shifted direction, and, in the
Central Hudson decision, concluded instead that accurate
commercial speech could be regulated by the state if its interest in
doing so met a lesser, although still rigorous, test.95
A mere six years later, though, the rigor seemed to evaporate from
the CentralHudson test, leaving accurate commercial speech with a
marginal, rather than an intermediate or full, degree of first
amendment protection. In a series of decisions beginning with

93. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
94. This history is summarized in Liquormart 44 v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484,497-98 (1996).
95. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Conm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980). The questions that needed to be considered under the Central
Hudson analysis were: a) does the speech accurately promote a legal product or
activity? b) is the governments interest in regulating the speech substantial? c)
does the regulation directly advance the government interest at issue? and d) is
there a reasonable fit between the regulation and the interest it is intended to
further? Id. at 564.
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96
Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of PuertoRico,

the Court seemed to accept virtually any justification a government
body offered for regulating, even banning, truthful advertising of
legal activities and products. The picture was complicated, however,
by the fact that, at the same time that the Court was applying a
highly permissive standard for regulation in some cases, it again
began to scrutinize the regulations in others with scrupulous care.97
Most recently, the schizophrenic quality of the Court's
jurisprudence on truthful commercial speech has given way and has
been replaced by a uniformly vigorous standard of review. Although
a majority of the Court has not yet been willing to reject a
government interest in regulating accurate commercial speech on
that ground that is insufficiently substantial, the Justices have
nonetheless put government on notice that it must be prepared to
defend its choices with convincing proof that the means chosen will
actually achieve the state's goals. Furthermore, at a minimum, the
state must also show that the restrictions used to implement the
policy are narrowly enough tailored to accomplish its objectives
without unnecessarily restricting speech. Under this approach,
regulation is unconstitutional whenever the Court is dissatisfied with
what it terms the "fit" between the government's objectives and the
means it has chosen to achieve them.
In 1995, for example, a federal law that prohibited listing the
alcohol content of malt beverages on their labels was struck down by
96. 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding law that allows advertising of legal casino
gambling to tourists but not to residents of Puerto Rico). Subsequent cases
applying a similarly undemanding standard include Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (upholding ban on most
commercial activities on campus); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509
U.S. 418 (1993) (upholding ban on advertising of lottery for purpose of reducing
demand for a legal activity).
97. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation,
Board of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (state cannot ban accurate use of
designations CPA or CFP by accountants); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (city cannot ban distribution of advertising in
newsracks on city property); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 781 (1993) (invalidating
rule barring in-person solicitation by accountants).
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the Court on the ground that the statutory provision at issue was not
sufficiently effective in firthering the federal government's interest
in preventing "strength wars" among brewers, and in addition that it
was overbroad.9" This was a far cry from the flabby justifications
that had sufficed to convince the Court to uphold the speech
regulations in Posadasde Puerto Rico and its kin.99 A year later, a
state law banning off-site advertising of liquor prices met a similar
fate for similar reasons."°
In the course of deciding these cases, the Court made clear that,
in the future, regulation of truthful advertising under Central
Hudson, while not impossible, can be accomplished only if the
government can defend the efficacy of its implementation strategy
and can show that its regulatory scheme is crafted to avoid an
overbroad approach. Frankly, I do not believe that many of the
current applications of the right of publicity could meet this standard.
But this may not be the end of the commercial speech saga. In
the last couple of years, a significant number of the justices have
signified their serious discomfort about continuing to apply
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to efforts to bar advertisers
from engaging in accurate commercial speech. So far, five of them
-- Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Stevens and Thomas -- have
expressed varying degrees of unhappiness with the use of Central
Hudson's more relaxed standards of review, and all but Justice Scalia
have announced their preference for applying standard first

98. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
99. The Court seems firmly to have turned its back on Posadasde PuertoRico
as valid precedent. Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality in Liquormart,said:
[O]n reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadaserroneously

performed the First Amendment analysis.
Liquormart 44 v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996). Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence agreed that the cursory examination of the
government's interests and its means used in Posadas had subsequently
been abandoned by the Court. Id. at 530-32.
100. Id.
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amendment strict scrutiny to regulation of such speech."° ' If a
majority coalesces around this position when the next appropriate
case presents itself, then the percentage of "easy" cases for the right
of publicity will be further diminished. Under this approach a court
faced with a publicity case that does not involve falsity might need
to find that the cause of action protects an interest of the highest
importance and that the "regulatory" tort remedy meets the least
restrictive means test.
The Court has not, however, signaled any change in its
willingness to permit significant regulation of false or genuinely
misleading commercial speech. State law can, therefore, allow
plaintiffs to exercise their publicity rights when the use of their
identifies is false in fact or by implication. But, as the law now
stands, accurate uses ought not to be actionable unless the state can
at least prove that the objective of the right of publicity is one that
101. In Coors, the majority simply rejected arguments of the sort that had
succeeded in Posadasde Puerto Rico without trying to explain the inconsistencies.
Justice Stevens, however, in a concurrence, laid the blame on Central Hudson,
calling the decision misguided and paternalistic. 514 U.S. at 493, 497-98.
(Stevens, J., concurring). Earlier, in Liquormart 44, Justice Stevens, writing for
himself and Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy, had taken a somewhat softer position
on the applicability of CentralHudson. He said:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer
information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However,
when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to
the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less
reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands.
517 U.S. at 501. Justice Thomas, however, flatly rejected CentralHudson in his
concurrence, taking the position that no difference exists between the
constitutional status of accurate commercial speech and political speech. Id. at 517
(Thomas, J., concurring in Pts. I, II, VI and VII, and concurring in the judgment).
Although he was not ready to declare his position, Justice Scalia wrote separately
in the same case to say that he shared Justice Thomas's unhappiness with Central
Hudson. Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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the tort law is actually capable of achieving."0 2 The problem cannot
be avoided merely by claiming that unconsented uses are per se
misleading. It is quite possible to make unconsented uses of the
identifying characteristics of well-known people to promote products
in ways that are entirely truthful. For instance, if Jack Nicholson
actually drinks Minute Maid orange juice, it is hard to argue that the
company falsified anything if it were to say so in its ads. It is often
argued that the use of a celebrity's name or face is automatically
translated in the public's mind to mean that the celebrity wants to
convince us to emulate him or her. This assumption seems strained;
it is more likely that viewers of the advertisement correctly assess
the purpose of the use: that is, that the company wants us to choose
to emulate the celebrity.
Nor would anyone be likely to be misled by the naming of a
Broadway theater after Franklin Delano Roosevelt into believing that
the late President was associated with it or otherwise endorsed it.
Using famous names for companies and institutions is such a
common practice that anyone who has grown up in this society
implicitly understands the convention out of which such naming
typically arises.' 3 Of course, there are undoubtedly circumstances
where incorrect inferences would be natural and expected. But by
all current indications, the Supreme Court is unlikely to permit lower
102. In Liquormart, a four-person plurality (including this time Justice Souter
as well as Ginsburg, Kennedy and Stevens) was highly critical of Rhode Island for
failing to provide convincing empirical data that its policies on advertising of
liquor prices would further its goal of reducing the consumption of alcohol. 517
U.S. at 505-07.
103. Federal trademark law contains a number of subject matter restrictions,
including a bar against using the name, face or signature of a president as a
trademark during the person's life or that of a surviving spouse. 15 U.S.C. §
1052(c). Whether or not this restriction and others of a similar kind in § 1052
would survive first amendment scrutiny is at present an open question. The
leading case on trademarks and the first amendment is San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987). In it,
the Supreme Court upheld a statute (36 U.S.C. § 220506, formerly 36 U.S.C. §
380) giving the U.S. Olympic Committee exclusive right to control use of the
Olympic name and symbol. For a thorough discussion of the case, see Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397 (1990).
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courts to assume the existence of confusion from the mere possibility
that a misreading could occur. The Court has already indicated that,
where facially accurate commercial speech is determined to be
misleading, that determination is subject on appeal to de novo
review. 11 4 As Justice Ginsburg wrote for a unanimous court in a
recent case, advertising cannot be treated as misleading unless that
10 5
claim can be "demonstrated with sufficient specificity."
3. The Implications of FirstAmendment Doctrinefor
Publicity andAppropriationCases.
This, then, brings us squarely to the issue that supporters of
publicity rights often seem to approach in intellectual fast-forward.
Can large segments of the publicity tort (or commercial
appropriation, for that matter) survive an application of the current
Central Hudson standards with teeth, or (in the worst case for the
tort) the kind of scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions of fully
protected speech?
The answer is probably not. Particularly if strict scrutiny is
imposed, precedent suggests that the tort law will not be permitted to
penalize accurate, unconsented uses simply because a celebrity
would prefer not to have this exposure or wants greater control over
it. After all, when states have put forth such interests as personal
privacy, individual peace of mind, and, to a substantial extent,
reputation as reasons to permit tort-based regulation of speech, those

104. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S.

91, 108 (1990).
105. Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 139 (1994). Justice Ginsburg noted that "We cannot
allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to supplant the Board's
burden to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real...' Id. at 146. She then
went on to note that the appropriate remedy for a possibility of confusion might be
a disclaimer rather than a ban of the speech. See also Peel, 496 U.S. at 111
(Marshall, J., concurring) (warning against finding speech misleading based on its
potential to be misinterpreted, and suggesting that requiring additional clarifying
information was preferable to prohibiting the speech).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3

40

Zimmerman: Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?

1998]

RIGHT OFPUBLICITY

interests have been deemed insufficiently weighty to overcome the
free speech claims on the other side."0 6
A different way, however, could be proposed for understanding
the interest at stake. It could be asserted that the state has a powerful
interest in protecting property rights as an aspect of personal liberty,
and that the value generated by one's personhood is a form of
property. Put succinctly, the argument is essentially that the first
amendment is not a license to steal.
It is true, of course, that the right to the undisturbed possession
of one's property is a valued right (and one that also enjoys
constitutional protection). The desire to publish the contents of a
celebrity's diary, for example, would be unlikely to privilege the act
of stealing it. But property interests are creatures of law; societies,
not nature, decide which sources of value will be allocated to
individuals or groups and which will be held in common. And in
this society, any decision to make pure information into property is
infused from the outset with constitutional complexities." 7
106. As long as the speech is truthful and the information is legally obtained,
the Supreme Court seems disinclined to permit tort recovery on privacy grounds.
See Florida Star v. B.I.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975). Where the information is false and defamatory, the Court
has allowed some speech regulation to protect reputation. A public person or
government official, however, must first carry the extremely difficult burden of
showing that the falsehood was either deliberate or uttered in reckless disregard of
its truth or falsity to recover. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 27980 (1964) (public officials); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, (1967)
(public figures). Private persons involved in matters of public concern must prove,
at a minimum, negligence to recover. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
347-48 (1974). These broad privileges, introduced to protect speech values, mean
that many defamed individuals cannot obtain a remedy under state law for their
injuries.
107. As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in a privacy case:
One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to
comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes
persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials.
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a
concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places
a primary
value on freedom2016
of speech and of press.
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The first amendment promise of freedom of speech depends on
a rich public domain to be meaningful. Information and ideas are
not a scarce resource and ordinarily do not need to be privatized to
be used efficiently. Tunis Wortman, whose book on free speech has
been described by the legal historian Leonard Levy as a "preeminent
American classic,"'0 8 once wrote of information that it is:
a general fund, of which all have a right to
participate: it is a capital which has the peculiar
property of increasing its stores in proportion as they
are used. We are entitled to pursue every justifiable
method of increasing our perceptions and
invigorating our faculties. We are equally entitled to
communicate our information to others.'0 9
If more than a marginal amount of information is turned into
intellectual property and its ownership parcelled out to private
individuals and corporations, the right to speak freely and to exercise
thought and imagination in the reprocessing of existing facts and
ideas will become largely theoretical for any except those with the
purse or the power to license the necessary content."' Decisions,
therefore, to turn information into a commodity cannot be made
lightly; each bit that is privately owned diminishes the fund of
material upon which the exercise of first amendment rights depends.
It is not sufficient, therefore, to start by presuming that
individuals are entitled to the value that inheres in particular types of
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Thus any tort giving an individual
the power to enjoin, or seek damages, for publication of information about them
raises constitutional questions.
108. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS at 332 (1985).
109. TUNIS WORTMhAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND
THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 140-41 (Leonard W. Levy, ed., Da Capo Press 1970)
(1800).
110. I have explored this point in greater detail in Zimmerman, Information as
Speech, supra note 39, generally and in particular at pp. 715-24.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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information about themselves; in fact, we should ask whether
recognition of such an entitlement, which necessarily restricts
speech, meets even the less demanding standard of Central Hudson
that the state show that its restriction will further a legitimate state
interest of some substantiality.
But even if courts remain reluctant to judge the substantiality of
the interest itself, at the very least, under Liquormart44 and Coors,
the state must still provide credible evidence that the publicity right
is designed in a way that substantially furthers its objectives in
granting the right in the first place. This is the point at which the
case for publicity rights most certainly begins to crumble.
I am not the first to point out the empirically dubious nature of
the claim that publicity rights serve more than a tangential role (if
that) in promoting investment in one's skills and talents.'
Most
people with a high enough public profile to make their names, faces
or the sound of their voices potentially valuable in an advertisement
do not do what they do primarily to create this kind of demand.
Advertising and promotional revenues are an artifact of their primary
activity; hence, they would be likely to make exactly the same
investment in their careers and creativity with or without a right of
publicity.
Although amateur athletes may hope for eventual revenues from
advertisements and endorsements, that possibility is remote for most
of them; the desire for recognition and the lure of high pay as a
professional, while itself also remote, would seem sufficiently
adequate incentives by themselves to keep kids on the basketball
court and the nation's sand lots. It is simply implausible to assume
that a successful actress would abandon a career on the stage or
devote less of her energies to it if she were prevented from capturing
the value generated by the demand for her photograph on a coffee
mug. And who actually believes that Vanna White would be too
demoralized to continue flipping her squares unless she is assured

111. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 95 F.3d
959, 973-76 (10th Cir. 1996).
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that robots can be prevented from pretending that they are going to
12
do her job in the twenty-first century.'
It has also been suggested that privatization of personality is
defensible because creating an ownership interest is the most
3
efficient way to exploit the economic value that inheres in identity."
This proposition is questionable as an empirical matter,"' but, more
importantly, it assumes away the very problem that the right of
publicity poses for free speech theory. By taking as a given that the
law should create private rights to avoid a kind of tragedy of the
commons in celebrity personas, the analysis assumes, rather than
attempting to demonstrate, the existence of the need for and
desirability of extracting maximum monetary benefits from this kind
of information flow.
The economic rationales for the right of publicity do not
exhaust those that have been offered. Harry Kalven suggested that
the reason to protect publicity rights is to prevent unjust enrichment
or unfair free-riding." 5 This argument, too, assumes away the
critical issues, this time by asserting the existence of some innate
entitlement to the value of personality that resides in the person who
created that value rather than seeking to defend the entitlement on
some instrumental public policy ground. This is a particularly sticky
sort of approach. It assumes that government can simply declare
some kinds of speech off limits to commercial speakers because of
some undemonstrable but inherent natural right in all value
112. Some might argue that athletes are motivated to invest in their sports by
the remote possibility of celebrity endorsement income in the future. The chances
are so slim, however, that it is hard to credit that baseball players and golfers and
ice skaters would not invest as heavily in their skills if they were deprived of the
property provided by a publicity right. In any event, as pointed out in this article,
advertisers will probably continue to contract for pay to get actual celebrity
endorsements.
113. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1994); Richard A.
Posner, The Right ofPrivacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978).
114. Madow, PopularCulture,supra note 4, at 222.
115. Kalven, Privacy,supranote 26.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/3
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stemming from the exertion of one's individuality and creativity. In
the first place, we clearly do not admit to the existence of this
"intimate connection" and the ensuing entitlement it generates in
other settings where speech regulation has tried to wall off the use of
personal information.'16 This observation alone should give rise to
some skepticism about using a rights-based justification in the
commercial speech arena. Furthermore, if commercial speech can be
banned by the simple expedient of declaring that some "natural
right" in information would otherwise be violated, an ill-defined
loophole would be opened in first amendment protection big enough
to drive that now-discredited 18-wheeler, the Posadas decision," 7
right back through the center. In essence, we would be back in the
position of saying that the state can ban commercial speech for
virtually any reason it chooses by arguing that it is protecting a
"right," and the mechanism of testing regulatory "fit" will not
provide a very good way of tempering this kind of regulatory overenthusiasm.
If these observations suggest that much of the right of publicity
is unconstitutional, one need not conclude that celebrities can never,
if they choose, earn extra cash by licensing their names and faces.
Companies will continue to pay sports stars to endorse breakfast
cereals and fancy cars; an advertiser who wants an identified star to
give an actual performance as part of a promotion will have to pay
for her services. ' But to the extent that companies can mine the
value associated with fame without the cooperation of the celebrity,
116. Claims of a property-like ownership of one's persona have generally failed
miserably in other aspects of privacy law, for example. A public disclosure of
private information cannot succeed unless it is so intimate that it would outrage
any ordinary, reasonable person and has no connection to a matter of public
concern. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1976). These conditions
are rarely met. See generally, Zimmerman, Privacy,supra note 56.
117. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
118. This article does not purport to address the complications that will be
introduced into this area as computer-manipulated and generated imagery is used
more commonly to create the appearance that people are in places they never were
and are doing things they never did.
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and can do so without sliding over the edge into the false or the
genuinely misleading, it is hard to see from a constitutional
perspective why they should not be entirely free to do so.119
I recognize, of course, that those who are convinced that the
right of publicity is fair and good may not be easily discouraged by
the prospect of climbing over additional constitutional hurdles. The
argument that value belongs to those who create it may be strong
enough to overcome other objections. Money -- whether it can be
made and who should make it -- is a powerful force and it has a way
of blurring our view of constitutional niceties. 2 Recognizing that
this is so, I would, therefore, like to close on a somewhat different
note.
I realize that, when all else is said and done, the reason that
publicity rights have such a broad and loyal following is rooted in an
intuition about fairness, a sense of the potential for a form of
distributive injustice if celebrities cannot demand control over and
payment for uses of their attributes. If an individual turns himself
into a valuable (i.e., popular and charismatic) personality, it seems
intuitively wrong to allow the benefits that flow from his devotion of
time and energy in becoming famous be reaped by corporate
freeloaders waving the banner of the first amendment. Let me
suggest, however, that there is another way to frame the issue.
It may be clarifying to discuss the value inherent in personality
as a form of economic surplus. Characteristic of the production of
goods, including intellectual goods, is the generation of surplus
value -- the economic space between the most a consumer would be
willing to pay and the minimum price for which the manufacturer is

119. Because computer-generated imagary can place people into new settings
and make them appear to do and say things they never did or said, this capability
may undercut much of the secondary market for celebrity that would otherwise
remain under the first amendment analysis I have outlined. This technology,
therefore, raises interesting and troubling questions, but ones that are beyond the
scope of this paper to address.
120. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 39, at 665-74.
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willing to sell. The traditional position of antitrust' and intellectual
property. 2 theorists is that this surplus is a benefit that ought
ordinarily to go to the consumer. Intellectual property law, it is
generally thought, should intervene to shift some part of that surplus
to the producer of the good in question only when failure to do so
would lead to suboptimal production.
When a robust right of publicity is recognized, the assumption
is often made that the law is acting to shift surplus value attaching to
a particular persona back to the celebrity who created it, and away
from the advertiser who is merely, as mentioned earlier, a free-rider.
In point of fact, however, what the right of publicity really does is to
shift value to celebrities by extracting it from the pockets of the
public. Individual consumers -- and not the advertisers of products
-- are the ones who pay for publicity rights, both in the increased
price of goods and services as well as in a decrease in information
flow.
As we have seen, the evidence that this wealth transfer actually
achieves some worthwhile public benefit in the form of creating
needed incentives is perishingly thin. In the ordinary world of
intellectual goods, therefore, this transfer of surplus from consumers
to celebrities would probably be seen generally as bad policy, as an
efficiency and -- to those of us old-fashioned enough to care -- also
as a distributive matter. If we are going to treat personality and fame
like an intellectual product, then we should be equally as careful not
to overprotect it as we are with other similar products. The value of
fame, if it is going to be treated as a commodity like mousetraps and
software, should have to live by the rules for mousetraps and
software. Unless shifting more financial rewards to the famous
convincingly gets us a more desirable level of celebrity, or a product
that we want and would not otherwise have, publicity claimants do
not have a legally compelling claim for a dollar more of the surplus
121. F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress 130-32, in REVITALIZING
ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY (Harry First et al. eds. 1991).

122. See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case,supra note 48; 8 MACAULEY, WORKS
(Trevelyan ed. 1879) 199-201, quoted in Zachariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law
of Copyright,45 COLuM. L. REV. 719-21 (1945).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

47

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

82

DEPAUL J ART & ENT. LAW

[Vol. IX:35

value associated with their fame. And surely a claim that makes no
sense in intellectual property terms provides a poor excuse for
diminishing the respect for first amendment values.
No matter how we choose to approach the topic, then, the final
conclusion remains the same: publicity is an interest, but in our
legal landscape, with its cherished protection of free speech, we
should not allow ourselves to make the serious mistake of getting
confused about which one is the "right."
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